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The globalﬁnancial crisis of 2007–09 raised questions aboutmany aspects of the economic system. After decades of
concern about how corporations govern themselves, more
attention is turning to other aspects of the complex web of
connections that make up the system of capital. This article ex-
amines one aspect of that system, shareholders – in particular
institutional investors and their engagement with the compa-
nies inwhich they invest.We review a broad body of literature
crossing several disciplines to develop a model of active own-
ership by institutional shareholders and a related research
agenda. Using themodel, we address the following questions:
First, why do some institutional investors operate at a distance
from organizations seemingly acting only to “exit” and
“trade” shares while others actively engage through various
means of “voice”? Second, what processes and behavior are
associated with active ownership?
The literature on shareholder activism1 addresses these
questions according to the characteristics of activists, target
ﬁrms, and the environment (Goranova & Ryan, 2014).*Address for correspondence: Terry McNulty, University of Liverpool Management
School, Chatham Street, Liverpool L69 7ZH, UK. Email: t.h.mcnulty@liverpool.ac.ukHowever, while shareholder activism is sometimes described
as a broad phenomenon (Chung&Wynn, 2014), our reﬂection
on the literature suggests it has been treated in quite a narrow
way conceptually, methodologically, and empirically. More
can be done to understand institutional investor heterogeneity
and related motivations, processes, and effects involved in
what we term “active ownership.”
Our concept of active ownership includes shareholder
activism, deﬁned as “actions taken by shareholders with the
explicit intention of inﬂuencing corporations’ policies and
practices” (Goranova & Ryan, 2014: 1232) but extends to a
wider range of institutional investor behavior, that incorpo-
rates developing relations with corporations through different
inﬂuence processes and intent. This type of on-going active
ownership is likely to involve mutual exchanges aimed at
understanding more than change, and taking a generally
longer-term perspective toward investment in the ﬁrm and
its affairs. Continuing engagement of this sort does not
preclude change-seeking, but it is part of the process, rather
than the process itself. Deﬁned in this way, active ownership
also contrasts with passive ownership, which involves
holding the shares; collecting dividends and perhaps voting,
but in an undeliberated way;2 and trading.
This article thus augments recent work on shareholder
activism (Goranova & Ryan, 2014) by considering alternative© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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tion to processes and plurality in relationships between inves-
tors and corporations, it infuses a debate dominated by
agency theory and the ﬁnancial incentives of shareholders
with alternative theories of shareholder motivation and
action. Prime among these are stewardship theory (Davis,
Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997) and ideas of psychological
ownership (Pierce, Kostova, & Dirks, 2001). Both are typically
used to analyze employee relationships with the ﬁrm
(Hernandez, 2012) and thus far rarely applied to the domain
of institutional investors and corporate governance (for a
notable exception, see Sikavica&Hillman, 2008). Hirschman’s
(1970) theory of exit, voice, and loyalty is also used, taking ac-
count of a recent review ofwork on voicewithin organizations
(Bashshur & Oc, 2015). Drawing on Greenwood and Hinings
(1996), these theoretical dimensions are set within the
contemporary market and institutional context of corporate
governance.
Normatively, the growing signiﬁcance of shareholder
engagement is emphasized by a longstanding debate about
the merits and mechanisms of shareholder empowerment. It
is seen as well in recent practitioner attention to investor
engagement and “stewardship” post-ﬁnancial crisis (Davis,
Lukomnik, & Pitt-Watson, 2009; Wong, 2010) and in public
policy development (Eumedion, 2011; EuropeanCommission,
2014; FRC, 2010, 2012; ORSE, 2011).
Our contributions lie, ﬁrst, in clarifying contrasting views
and images of ownership; second, in portraying the antece-
dents of active ownership; and third, in building a model of
how those antecedents create pathways to diverse processes
of active ownership. We then identify suggestions for future
research, drawing attention to substantive issues that range
frommarket and institutional conditions, through investment
organization and practice, to board and investor relations.IMAGES OF OWNERSHIP
What does it mean to “own” a corporation?While parts of the
corporate governance literature view owners as a simple
construct of value-maximizing agents, recent scholarly work
and policy documents have acknowledged the heterogeneity
of investors (Isaksson & Çelik, 2013; Wang, 2014; Westphal
& Zajac, 2013). Ownership has special resonance in law,
psychology, sociology, and organization studies, invoking
contesting conceptual framings.Ownership as Rights
In legal scholarship on property, ownership is discussed as
consisting of a bundle of rights. Demsetz (1967: 348) argues:
“A primary function of property rights is that of guiding
incentives to achieve a greater internalization of externalities.”
Owners’ rights open important controversies in the corpo-
rate governance literature. Control over assets is conferred
upon managers, who act as agents of the principals, that is,
the legal holders of equity in the company,3 creating an agency
problem when managers work in their own rather than in
shareholders’ interest. The agency problem operates on the
assumption that shareholders hold residual rights; that is,© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltdthey face the greatest risk when a company is in insolvency,
justifying a privilege of primacy in decision making.
Shareholder primacy is much disputed (Mukwiri, 2013;
Stout, 2013), by drawing upon the limited nature of share-
holder rights in company law, and by challenging the argu-
ment concerning residual rights. The latter point leads to a
dispute concerning the residual rights of employees (and
indeed other stakeholders) that arise in view of their ﬁrm-
speciﬁc investments in acquiring non-transferable knowledge
and skills or from social bonds developed by their commit-
ment to the company’s business. These ideas argue against
shareholder primacy and the latter points us toward another
conceptualization of ownership.
Ownership as Commitment
Etzioni (1991) argues that property exists on two levels of
meaning, the real and the symbolic, with objective and subjec-
tive properties. The real/objective level corresponds closely to
notions both of legal and equitable ownership in law and of a
view of the ﬁrm based in transaction cost economics. The
symbolic/subjective level, however, involves rather different
assumptions, one in which the person invests emotionally
and identiﬁes with the thing “owned.”
Pierce et al. (2001: 299) develop this latter idea, identifying
affective and cognitive dimensions: “The core of psychological
ownership is the feeling of possessiveness and of being
psychologically tied to an object.” Ownership has its “roots”
in satisfying a need, in building an identity, and in having a
sense of place (Pierce et al., 2001).4 As we discuss later,
Sikavica and Hillman (2008) invoke psychological ownership
in their analysis of shareholder activism.
Owner Versus Trader
These two conceptualizations contrast with a third and
increasingly common view of the ways that shareholders
“own” the corporation. Ownership confers speciﬁc rights –
importantly, electing directors and approving major changes
in capital – to shareholders, that is, to the persons (real or legal)
who hold the shares when votes are cast.5 For large, listed
corporations, shareholders change all the time, as trading in
equity markets occurs and investors shift between different
shares or switch asset classes (e.g., from equities to real estate).
Major capital markets pride themselves on their liquidity,
making trading easier. Trading-focused rights-holders are of-
ten perceived as having short-term interests, more interested
in the size of capital gains possible by churning investments
than in the fundamentals of the businesses in which they
invest.
Universal Ownership
This “trading” stance presents a sharp contrast to “universal
ownership,” a concept developed by two investment man-
agers, Monks andMinow (1995), whose investment approach
agitated for change at investee companies but with larger
social and economic purposes in mind. They saw logical allies
in pension funds and other investors whose interests lie in
long-term performance of the economy for the beneﬁt of
vsociety as a whole. With ﬁduciary duties to large numbersVolume 24 Number 3 May 2016
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tors should be interested in being more than the “trader,”
whose concerns end with the relative performance of one
company’s shares versus another. This idea was developed
by Hawley and Williams (2000), who see the structure and
processes in the market context separating beneﬁciaries from
the operationalization of ownership rights. Lydenberg (2007)
then sees this as justiﬁcation for a greater unity of interests
and action among universal owners and social investors.
More recently, Lydenberg (2014) advocated seeing the ﬁdu-
ciary duty of such investors to engage in long-term invest-
ment for the beneﬁt of society as a whole. Such investors
form the archetype of another image of ownership: the
steward.Owner as Steward
Drawing upon ideas of a commitment-focused approach to
ownership and universal ownership, policymakers encourage
investors to engage with the corporations and to look at the
long term. A signiﬁcant move of this nature was the UK
Stewardship Code (FRC, 2010; revised 2012), subsequently
reﬂected in policy in other countries and organizations, with
echoes of stewardship theory in corporate management
(Davis et al., 1997). Hernandez (2012: 174) deﬁnes
stewardship as the “extent to which an individual willingly
subjugates his or her personal interests to act in protection of
others’ long-term welfare.” It is pro-social action, involving
cognitive and affective mechanisms as antecedents to
stewardship actions.
The concept of stewardship in corporate governance posits
thatmostmanagers subordinate personal interests to the good
of the organization and have intrinsic rather than just extrinsic
(i.e,, ﬁnancial) motivations (Davis et al., 1997). It points
normatively to conclusions diametrically opposed to those in
agency theory, namely that managers should be trusted more
than controlled, supported more than monitored. While
regulators, since the ﬁnancial crisis, have promoted images
of stewardship, others are more skeptical, viewing the market
context as one that works against steward-like behavior from
investors (Reisberg, 2015), creating an “Achilles’Heel” for the
project (Chefﬁns, 2010).
These images of ownership and the shift in the policy
context raise important questions of investor and owner
psychology and behavior. Set against them and the empirical
heterogeneity of investors noted by Goranova and Ryan
(2014), Figure 1 identiﬁes different approaches to ownership
and what this means for corporate ownership and gover-
nance. This is now explored in detail via two distinct
pathways of owner behavior.VARIETIES AND PATHWAYSOFOWNERSHIP
The distinction between “ﬁnancial” and “socially motivated”
activism (Aguilera, Desender, Bednar, & Lee, 2015; Goranova
& Ryan, 2014; Judge, Gaur, & Muller-Kahle, 2010) encourages
examination of different motivations of shareholders and how
they translate into active ownership behavior. In their histori-
cal account of three overlapping social movements in the US –
socially responsible investment (SRI), shareholder value, andVolume 24 Number 3 May 2016responsible investment – Welker and Wood (2011) illustrate
a variety of shareholder interests and identities. SRI emerged
in the 1960s and 1970s as activists sought to pluralize “both
the category of shareholders and their moral beliefs”; share-
holder value “folded shareholders into a singular homoge-
neous category and endowed them with a singular purpose:
proﬁt” (Welker & Wood, 2011: S61). The responsible invest-
ment movement is a synthesis, emphasizing regard for
economic and governance as well as social concerns under
the rubric ESG. This view “converts moral into economic
reason such that responsible investing will conform to the
shareholder value imperative” (Welker & Wood, 2011: S58).
Responsible investors take a long-term view, drawing a link
between ﬁnancial returns and socially and environmentally
beneﬁcial outcomes. Responsible investing translates the
goals of one into the values of the other, thus revitalizing the
shareholder as a fuller “person.”
That typology adds greater variety, human texture and con-
text to distinctions such as “ﬁnancial” and “social” activism.
Our model of active ownership explores this variation and
its expression in investor behavior, distinguishing two differ-
ent approaches.
The ﬁrst is signiﬁed by the path labeled as (a) in the model,
which splits to show that institutional shareholders, as legal
owners, can exercise rights to “exit” and “voice.” Investors
pursuing path (a) may do so with purely ﬁnancial interests
and incentives in mind, as seen in cases of corporate raiders
and much hedge fund activism, as Goranova and Ryan
(2014) discuss. But they also include ideologically driven
activists, who use their legal rights as shareholders to advance
causes with limited regard for the impact on the company.
Other investor behavior along path (a) can include passively
following the index, trading by mathematical models, or exits
made out of disapproval with current business policy, some-
times called the “Wall Street Walk” (Admati & Pﬂeiderer,
2009). This is displayed in the model as path (a) passes
through legal ownership to “exit.”
The range of behavior represented by path (a) covers a lot of
investor action. In a commentary published alongside the
article byWelker andWood (2011: S67), Monks estimated that
only 20 per cent of shares are held by investors who “might be
thought of as real proprietors or even activist investors.”
However, even if it is the behavior of the majority in the
market, path (a) is partial and inadequate for understanding
motivations and behavior involved in active ownership,
signiﬁed by path (b) in the model. Central to the difference
between paths (a) and (b) is the phenomenon of psychological
ownership. Considerations (cognitive mechanisms) and atti-
tudes (affective mechanisms) make path (b) qualitatively
different from path (a) in terms of investor engagement. This
second approach, path (b), is our primary focus. The following
discussion considers each element of the model, starting with
antecedents of active ownership related to “market context,”
“institutional ﬁeld,” the “ﬁrm,” and “mechanisms of psycho-
logical ownership.”ANTECEDENTS OFACTIVE OWNERSHIP
The ﬁnancial crisis provoked a reconsideration of the role
of markets in corporate governance, in particular the© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
FIGURE 1
A Model of Active Ownership
349INVESTORS AS ACTIVE OWNERSﬁnancialization of the economy (Fichtner, 2013; Mizruchi,
2010). Concerns voiced before the crisis, in particular among
environmental and social activists but also corporations,
about the short-term focus of investors (Aspen Institute,
2009; Bushee, 1998; Tonello, 2006) became a pressing matter
of public policy work (Group of 30, 2012; Kay, 2012) and em-
pirical analysis (Hutchinson, Seamer, & Chapple, 2015; Wang,
2014), leading to a normative debate (OECD, 2011; Pozen,
2014) and institutional changes. This section examines how
changes in the market context and institutional arrangements
put large investors under conﬂicting pressures with respect to
engagement with corporations.Market Context (Controls, Rewards, and Power)
Financial markets provide structures that shape the rewards
of institutional investors as market actors, exert certain
controls on their behavior, and inform development of active
ownership. For reasons discussed below, it is a market context
more oriented to institutional investor behavior described in
path (a) rather than path (b).
Historically, equity markets developed to enhance capital
formation. They did so ironically by increasing liquidity and
making it easier for investors to withdraw from their invest-
ment, thus reducing the risk associatedwith owning company
shares. Hirschman (1970) therefore saw equity markets giving
emphasis to exit over voice. The more liquid the market, the
more shareholders prefer exit to voice. Cox and Wicks (2011)
ﬁnd that reduced market liquidity is associated with greater
engagement. Investors more likely to use exit rather than
voice shun illiquid investments, making those companies
more likely to experience investor engagement. However, like
founders and family members, holders of large blocks of
shares are less able to sell without adverse consequences on
price, so they would prefer voice over exit (Marler & Faugère,© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd2010). Moreover, their inability to sell gives them a greater
residual risk, helping to legitimate that voice.
By creating a way to take over and transform listed compa-
nies, equitymarkets also provide a vehicle to facilitate exercise
of legal ownership rights, making voice more effective.
Theorizing a market for corporate control, Manne (1965,
1984) set the stage for a ﬁrst wave of large-scale shareholder
activism, through the actions of “corporate raiders,” in which
control created rewards for activists (Croci, 2007). Empirical
studies question the effectiveness of this method of control
(e.g., Walsh & Kosnik, 1993), and the critique has intensiﬁed
since the ﬁnancial crisis (e.g., Widmer, 2011).
The period from the late 1990s through the ﬁnancial crisis
saw development of new investment vehicles, in particular
hedge funds and sovereign wealth funds (Aguilera, Capapé,
& Santiso, ; Bebchuk, Brav, & Jiang, 2015), able to channel
large investments into equity markets. In addition, ﬁnance
became an increasingly global market. Continental European
exchanges emulated US practices to attract new company
listings and investment funds.
Contributing to the evolving backdrop are changes in
equity market structures that have increased liquidity and
changed practices of investors. One is the consolidation of
exchanges, bringing small orders together in one place and
facilitating cross-border trading. Another is the development
of off-exchange platforms creating “dark pools” of liquidity
in which large shareholders could enter or exit positions more
easily without adverse price implications (Kwan, Masulis, &
McInish, 2015).
Another structural change is the growth of index-tracking.
Index-tracking began long before the ﬁnancial crisis, but the
crisis accelerated demand for asset diversiﬁcation at a low
cost. Seeing their strategic direction in cost leadership,
index-trackers have incentives that argue against enga-
gement, a phenomenon decried by one of the industry’s
founders (Bogle, 2011). Practice changes, including use ofVolume 24 Number 3 May 2016
350 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEWderivative instruments, laid the groundwork for investment
strategies offering abnormally positive and notionally riskless
returns that some hedge funds promised. Short-selling and
share lending, often by passive, index-tracking investors
looking for extra yield, have become a central part of equity
trading. Bans on short-selling enacted in 2008, early in the
ﬁnancial crisis, may have brought little reduction volatility
and only served to reduce liquidity and thereby price
discovery (Curtis & Fargher, 2014).
Rewards in investment can also shape the propensity to
engage. Most investment managers are rewarded on a combi-
nation of fees levied on portfolio size and on the capital gains
achieved, creating incentives for fund growth (e.g., winning
new mandates) and investment performance. The balance
between these two types of rewards reﬂects the fund’s invest-
ment style and function. Those with speciﬁc ﬁduciary duties
(e.g., pension funds) may have other responsibilities, which
will affect how they choose their investments and what
attitude they adopt towards engagement.6
Some changes, including the market for corporate control,
derivatives, short-selling and other moves to increase liquid-
ity, arose from enabling legislation or regulatory develop-
ments. They have diminished these justiﬁcations for
engagement, creating disincentives for long-term investing
and active ownership (Isaksson & Çelik, 2013). These forces
are in contrast to non-market institutional forcesmore inclined
post crisis to emphasize active ownership.Institutional Field
Institutional arrangements shape investor engagement. These
arrangements include the formal rights and responsibilities
accruing from share ownership; semi-formal, voluntary
codes; and informal, taken-for-granted assumptions about
the purposes of investment management.
Company law establishes the basis of share ownership and
associated rights. While rights vary in detail by jurisdiction, in
general share ownership entitles the holder to elect directors,
approve material changes in the capital, and decide on major
changes in direction. It does not give the holder rights over
the assets of the business, while limited liability puts a ceiling
on shareholders’ responsibility for debt.
Policy in the US since the 1970s has favored the market for
corporate control over direct regulation of investor engage-
ment. Elsewhere, semi-formal institutions played a formative
role, and developments in the UK often gave a lead to other
jurisdictions. While the Cadbury Report (1992) focused
mainly on corporate boards, it also called for enhanced inter-
action with shareholders, and in particular with institutional
investors, which were deemed best able to monitor corporate
management and prevent excess. Subsequently, the Hampel
Report (1998) and a government review of institutional
investment (Myners, 2001) articulated investor–corporate
interaction.
After protracted debate, the European Union adopted a
Shareholder Rights Directive in 2007, enhancing the ability
of shareholders to vote on a cross-border basis, solidifying
ownership rights, encouraging engagement, and bolstering
legal ownership (Eckbo, Paone, & Urheim, 2010; Rose, 2012).
The EU has also moved to give investors a right to vote onVolume 24 Number 3 May 2016corporate remuneration policies (European Commission,
2014). Another institutional change, in pension reform, led to
changes in market structure, not least the reduced importance
of deﬁned-beneﬁt, ﬁnal-salary pension arrangements at many
companies and their replacement with deﬁned-contribution
pensions based in part on life insurance contracts (Holzmann
& Palmer, 2006).
These shifts led to greater shareholder entitlement to
engage. Conversely, they encouraged a relative ﬂow of invest-
able funds toward the new investment vehicles and away
from the archetypal long-term investors in pension funds.
Pension funds themselves have diversiﬁed into newer,
“alternative” investments. The institutional context thus
favored shareholder challenge to management (activism)
while diminishing the role of investors that might be
identiﬁed as having long-term investment horizons.
With the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis came a policy shift to
promote shareholder engagement. The UK Stewardship
Code for investors (FRC, 2010) called attention to the ﬁdu-
ciary duties of institutional investors to their beneﬁciaries. A
review for the UK government of short-termism in markets
(Kay, 2012) highlighted the lengthening supply chain in in-
vestment, and that institutional investors were one of a series
of intermediaries at some distance from the end-investor and
therefore the ultimate principal in the principal–agent
relationship.
Countries, including Germany, France, Japan, the Nether-
lands, and Italy, followed suit, and EU green papers
(European Commission, 2011, 2013) raised similar questions,
which were incorporated in a proposal to revise the Share-
holder Rights Directive (European Commission, 2014). In the
US, regulation arising from the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act gave shareholders
voice over executive pay (“Say on Pay”) and revived attempts
to make it easier for them to present resolutions to the annual
meeting (“proxy access”).
These policy moves (though less directly those in the US)
envisage what we see as path (b) ownership, that is, ongoing
engagement by institutional investors with investee com-
panies. The revised UK Stewardship Code (FRC, 2012) calls
for “purposeful dialogue” to promote “understanding,”
alongside their monitoring of corporate performance. This
approach continues to legitimate shareholder primacy but it
also encourages ongoing engagement and stewardship, rather
than just relying on episodic activism and ultimately the
market for corporate control.
Policy moves differ in detail but they embody assumptions
about ownership and its rights and encourage institutional
investors to act in ways similar to the “universal owner.” This
view is at considerable distance from the image and practice
of the self-regarding, value-maximizing trader in path (a),
with ﬁnancial preferences for capital gains sooner rather than
dividends later.
Thus, while developments in policy and institutions have
sought to pull investors toward engagement, pressure from
markets seems to push them toward trading (Aguilera &
Jackson, 2003; Davis, 2008, 2010). The heterogeneity of
investors and their motivations mean they may respond in
different ways to these pressures, whether through voice or
exit. To understand better the processes and prospects of
engagement, we need to understand the link between© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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deeply engaged.
Mechanisms of Psychological Ownership
Having established a relatively clear route, path (a), from the
market and institutional context to legal ownership to exit or
activism, we turn now to the more complex path (b), which
leads through psychological ownership to different investor
behavior. The policy moves outlined above seek to alter the
behavior of investors in the direction of path (b) using incen-
tives and invective. To understand what may be involved in
a more engaged approach to ownership, the next section
examines stewardship theory, beginning with the cognitive
and affective mechanisms that underlay stewardship beha-
vior (Hernandez, 2012). At this point, the model broadens
beyond agency theory and assumptions of shareholder
activism to offer a very different potential for institutional
investor behavior.
Examining employee stewardship, Hernandez (2012: 181,
183, 185) identiﬁes cognitive and affective mechanisms that
develop “other-regarding” behavior, a “long-term communal
welfare” and “affective commitment through mutual social
exchange.” These mechanisms create an “internal drive” in
individuals to psychological ownership. In contrast to agency
theory, which focuses on ownership and control as a source of
power expressed through legal ownership supported by
residual rights, psychological ownership is a cognitive-
affective construct creating “a personal motivation to protect
the object of ownership” (Hernandez, 2012: 182).
Cognitive. In portfolio theory and practitioner accounts
(cf. Bogle, 2011; Hutchinson et al., 2015), the motivations in
institutional investment are often described in ﬁnancial terms,
following a rational perspective, dominated by self-interest
and reinforced by ﬁnancial analysis, asset allocation, and
risk-reward calculations. This chimes with the priority given
to proﬁt in the shareholder valuemovement (Welker &Wood,
2011). While such cognitive mechanisms may be calculative,
focused on short-term goals, and self-serving, there are
alternatives.Hernandez (2012: 183) proposes that stewardship
cognition depends on deﬁning one’s self in relation to others,
engaging in “pro-organization” behaviors for the long-term
beneﬁts of others.
Affective. Affect is “sense of connection with others” aris-
ing through mutual social exchange and prompting stewards
to inﬂuence the collective in a positive way (Hernandez, 2012:
175). Stewards have an emotional tie to the beneﬁciaries of
their actions as well as a deliberative one. Stewards show a
sense of commitment, again for the long term. Affective
mechanisms build connections and emotional attachment to
the organization. Such regard for others and long-term orien-
tation chime with the ideas of responsible investment, as
shareholders seek to encourage companies not to “externalize
their costs onto society”while “promoting the interests of the
long-term shareholder” (Welker & Wood, 2011: S65).
Structural factors such as control processes and reward sys-
tems inﬂuence development of cognitive and affective mecha-
nisms. This suggests the interaction and balance of cognitive
and affective is dependent on the market and institutional© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltdcontext, the incentives and controls they create, and on the
business policy choices and processes of the investors.
In our model, the dotted line from legal to psychological
ownership indicates the potential for investors to evolve in
their behavior as they develop some of the cognition and
attitudes associated with psychological ownership. This can
occur as institutional investors adapt their investment
principles, their portfolios, and their practices of voice to mix
principles of shareholder value with principles of responsible
investment.
From Legal to Psychological Ownership and
Stewardship
In Hernandez (2012) and Pierce et al. (2001), psychological
ownership is seen among employees when they are not in
any sense legal owners. Hernandez (2012) sees psychological
ownership arising as an other-regarding, long-term perspec-
tive from the cognitive side combined with the affective com-
mitment arising frommutual social exchange. Both arise from
control systems that foster collaboration and personal respon-
sibility and reward systems providing intrinsic motivations.
Sikavica and Hillman (2008) extend this concept into the
world of shareholders, arguing that psychological ownership
is “the natural complement to legal ownership.” Their discus-
sion stops short of accounting for the complexity and varieties
of internal dynamics of institutional investors or how the
market and institutional dynamics interact with them.
In the case of investment institutions, and with reference to
the model, their legal ownership is not disputed; what differ-
entiates activism along path (a) from the ongoing relationship
of path (b) is that investors possess psychological as well as
legal ownership. Exploring difference between paths (a) and
(b) as reﬂected in processes and behavior of investors is the
subject of the next part of the model and section of the paper.FROM ANTECEDENTS TO PROCESSES OF
ACTIVE OWNERSHIP: SHAREHOLDER
VOICE, EXIT, AND LOYALTY
The progression from “antecedents” to “processes” of active
ownership is framed byHirschman’s (1970) theoretical frame-
work of exit, voice, and loyalty. It suggests that investors have
a limited range of actions open to them, often interpreted as
exit through selling shares, loyalty through holding shares,
and voice through shareholder activism (Goranova & Ryan,
2014).
The model identiﬁes two distinct pathways to institutional
investor “voice” distinguished by different relationships
between corporate managers and institutional investors,
different investormotivations, and serving different functions.
While path (a) in our model may proceed directly to “exit,” it
may also lead to shareholder activism, an episodic approach
in which investors voice speciﬁc change-led intent. Activism
so conceived is primarily self-interested, may be ﬁnancially
or ideologically motivated, and with short-term objectives.
By contrast, path (b) involves interaction underpinned by
concerns and attitudes that privilege the welfare and beneﬁts
beyond the self in favor of a wider group of “others.” This
stewardship orientation can underpin ongoing relationshipsVolume 24 Number 3 May 2016
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standing for aims that are other-regarding and embodying a
long-term orientation. As the paths are deﬁned by processes
not social and ﬁnancial ideologies per se, either path could be
taken by a wide range of investment organizations.
Within the distinction between paths (a) and (b), different
conceptual and empirical relationships between loyalty, exit,
and voice become more apparent. Hirschman’s discussion of
the framework in a corporate context implies that the more
liquid the market in shares, the more likely exit will be pre-
ferred to voice. Voice requires effort, can be costly, andmay re-
quire coordination with others. Exit can be an individual
decision and accordingly: “The presence of the exit alternative
can … tend to atrophy the development of the art of voice”
(Hirschman, 1970: 43, original emphasis). But Admati and
Pﬂeiderer (2009) show how exit can be a form a voice and
have disciplinary effects on corporatemanagement, especially
when pay is tied to the share price.
Active ownership, in particular along path (b), involves
loyalty, which is positioned centrally in the model and with
a permeable boundary to exit on the one hand and voice on
the other. Following Bootsma (2013), loyalty contributes to
the “interplay” or “balance between exit and voice.” Voice
“means that shareholders exchange their views with the
corporation. It involves interaction, a dialogue with the man-
agement of the corporation” (Bootsma, 2013: 117). Voice and
loyalty interact through thoughtful hold decisions, employed
by engaged institutional investors not through the “blind
loyalty” in the passive holding of shares, as in low-cost
index-tracking, but through reasons to be loyal in preference
to exercising exit. Loyalty reinforces the predisposition to
exercise voice and counteracts the presumed preference for
exit in liquid markets. Echoing the preceding discussion of
psychological ownership, loyalty involves some form of
attachment to the corporation. Bootsma (2013) connects
stewardship behavior and voice by distinguishing between
“true” and “faux voice.” “Faux voice” is self-interested, super-
ﬁcial engagement, while true voice is calculated behavior with
some long-term considerations.
These conceptual developments and nuances highlight the
diverse behavior and implications implied by paths (a) and
(b). Path (a) allows for voice to be expressed as shareholder
activism that is targeted at incumbent managers and boards,
problem-focused and change-oriented. Much of the share-
holder activism literature is cast in this image of self-interested
shareholders bringing pressure to bear on companies in light
of their interests, power, and identities (Goranova & Ryan,
2014). Along path (b) voice has a different tenor and behavioral
expression, underpinned by a contrasting approach to self-
interest, identiﬁcation with the interests of others, and active
engagement over time. To explore this distinction further, it
is necessary to probe behavior involved in shareholder action.PROCESSES OF INVESTOR–FIRM
INTERACTION
Our model of active ownership involves the interaction of
corporate managers and institutional investors. Central to
our concerns is shareholder voice as expressed along paths
(a) and (b).Volume 24 Number 3 May 2016Shareholder Actions
Empirical analyses tend to focus on voice that reaches public
attention, whether through the voting records of institutional
investors (Conyon & Sadler, 2010), shareholder resolutions
proposed to company annual meetings (Rehbein, Logsdon &
Van Buren, 2013), or hostile actions taken by disgruntled
hedge funds that gain media attention (Katelouzou, 2013).
These forms of shareholder voice are evident in path (a) and
what we term activism, an investor-led, episodic approach
with speciﬁc change-led intent. Cases in which investors
confront ﬁrm managements or boards with speciﬁc change
requests are the least ambiguous exercise of voice. The
investor may be following path (a) directly, seeing immediate
beneﬁts from the ﬁrm’s agreement to increase the dividend,
change the chief executive, or abandon a planned acquisition.
The investor’s intent would then be guided by self-regarding,
short-term considerations. Such actions are not necessarily
detrimental to the company and its long-term prospects.
Studies provide equivocal evidence that the short-termism of
investors is incompatible with long-term beneﬁts for the ﬁrm
(Bebchuk et al., 2015; Brav, Jiang, Partnoy & Thomas, 2008a;
Buchanan, Chai & Deakin, 2014; Katelouzou, 2013) and anal-
yses (Coffee & Palia, 2014; Schneider & Ryan, 2011; Sharfman,
2015; Venkiteshwaran, Iyer & Rao, 2010).
Investors may also work together to increase their salience
when confronting management. Crespi and Renneboog
(2010) and Sauerwald and Peng (2013) show how coalitions
of shareholders can effect changes in corporate management
in confrontations with investors seeking change, what we
have called path (a) interventions.
By contrast, along path (b), the exercise of shareholder voice
unfolds in a very differentmanner, whereby voice is expressed
through engagement between shareholders and managers
over time. Such engagement accommodates plural actors
pursuing a mix of principles, logics, and ideologies. As an ex-
pression of active ownership, path (b) describes shareholders
engaging directly withmanagement in a process that involves
challenge and change of mutual beneﬁt or at least accommo-
dation. The process can involve, even beginwith, mechanisms
of shareholder voice, such as voting and resolutions, but it also
involves private dialogue, often over a considerable time.
Such corporate–investor engagement is attributed to vari-
ous systems of corporate governance around the world as a
modus operandi, but it is not as well recognized in the literature
because its private nature prevents much empirical study.
Martin, Casson, and Nisar (2007) describe different forms of
interactions and how umbrella organizations of investors
orchestrate interactions with companies in the UK, paying
particular attention to traditional investors in insurance,
pensions, and collective investment. Martin et al. (2007: 81)
categorize such meetings as “routine” and “extraordinary,”
where the latter tends to be issue-led and the former infor-
mation exchanges and maintaining relationships. A current
expression of the desire to foster a return to more of this
“routine” approach to ownership can be seen in the Steward-
ship Code, a cause that has been criticized as harking back to
the past (Chefﬁns, 2010; Reisberg, 2011).
Engagement of the sort practiced in path (b) is also evident
in the strategic approach to advocacy by shareholders who
follow a social agenda. Logsdon and Van Buren (2009) and© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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Corporate Responsibility (ICCR), a coalition of shareholder
activist groups in the US, to focus on dialogue. This occurs
“when corporations and shareholder activist groupsmutually
agree to engage in ongoing communications to deal with a
serious social issue as an alternative to the formal vote on a
shareholder resolution” (Logsdon & Van Buren, 2009: 354).
Both studies depict dialogue as a process that occurs in private
and affords investors and corporation an opportunity for a
relationship of mutual understanding and beneﬁt over time.
Such a relationship involves both parties being committed to
negotiated solutions and coming to agreement on common
principles of corporate practices and policies.
Goodman, Louche, van Cranenburgh, and Arenas (2014) go
beyond Logsdon and Van Buren (2009) to examine the
dynamics of voice and exit. For their study Goodman et al.
(2014) eschew a focus on certain methods and outcomes in
favor of an analysis of the engagement process as a whole
including the “dynamics of the voice and exit options.”
Through an inductive case study approach of seven engage-
ments on social, environmental, and ethical issues by three
religious organizations, they model shareholder engagement
as occurring in four procedural stages: issue-raising; informa-
tion search and commencement of communication with the
company; change-seeking using a range of methods; and out-
comes, whichmay be satisfactory or unsatisfactory. Goodman
et al. (2014) conclude that the dynamics of voice and exit differ
in such processes of engagement: shareholders did not base
their exit and voice decisions on economic considerations
but political ones, using voice to further their beliefs and
mission in society. They did not use the “silent exit” option,
as being a comparatively small shareholder. If exit is used at
all, divestment is combined with public statements (voice)
that serve political argument. In contrast to Hirschman
(1970), for Goodman et al. (2014: 208), voice and exit are
“dynamic, mutually reinforcing and not necessarily sequen-
tial.” Divestment may indeed be accompanied by continuing
external engagement.
Managerial Actions
The preceding discussion approaches the issue from the point
of view of shareholders. Of course, paths (a) and (b) imply
very different situations for corporate management. It is
important to also examine howmanagers behave in processes
of shareholder voice and active ownership.
Goranova and Ryan (2014) suggest that management may
be proactive or reactive, resistant or receptive. If receptive,
the management response may be symbolic or substantive.
Firms may decide not to listen, that is, not to engage with
shareholders, or engage in an insincere, symbolic way
(Westphal & Zajac, 1998) that does not allow a change in ﬁrm
direction and signals rejection to the observant investor.
These categorizations depict the variety of responses to
voice along path (a). We expand these categories, especially
in the light of path (b), with dialogue as a form of managerial
response that can open up a collaborative and constructive
dynamic between investors and managers seeking to develop
mutual understanding and beneﬁts.
How ﬁrms react will depend on the salience of the voice.
Drawing on the three attributes of stakeholder salience in© 2015 John Wiley & Sons LtdMitchell, Agle, and Wood (1997), Gifford (2010) studies the
legitimacy, power, and urgency of shareholder engagement
practices within three sizeable institutional investor organiza-
tions, Hermes and Insight Investment in the UK and the US-
based Calvert. Gifford (2010) identiﬁes that a strong business
case and the values of the managers of investee companies
are likely to be themost important contributors to shareholder
salience. Similarly, Rehbein et al. (2013) ﬁnd that corporate
managers are more likely to engage in dialogue with share-
holder activists when the ﬁrm is larger and more responsive
to stakeholders, when the CEO is the board chair, and when
the ﬁrm has a relatively low percentage of institutional inves-
tors. Set within resource dependency theory, the study draws
attention to a positive relationship betweenmanagerial uncer-
tainty and shareholder salience.
These ﬁndings and theoretical explanations remind us that
paths (a) and (b) imply very different situations for corporate
management. In terms of process, a public conﬂict backed
by ownership size, path (a) may provoke a managerial re-
sponse that is reactive and resistant. The process is an overt
conﬂict and power-play likely to end up with winners and
losers. By contrast, along path (b), processes of dialogue and
engagement suggest a different basis of salience, one that is
less rooted in power and more in the legitimacy of the issue
and the unfoldingmutuality. By acknowledging the challenge
of activists or the information-seeking and dialogue, the ﬁrm
legitimates investor voice; indeed, reasons for declining sug-
gestions may be sufﬁciently compelling that they persuade
the investor to alter its view and policy. However, in acknow-
ledging and accepting an investor’s position, the ﬁrm alters its
stance and enacts change. Through the interaction, and
through iterated interactions, both cognitive and affective
mechanisms may come into play, deepening the bond of psy-
chological ownership. The process of dialogue and engage-
ment opens up space for a response and relationship that is
more collaborative and constructive.
Such processes are dynamic and informed by the outcomes.
As Goodman et al. (2014) observe, investors will not necessa-
rily engage in ongoing dialogue without some sense of
progress. In conditions of psychological ownership but an
unresponsive ﬁrm, the investor may choose to exit, though
with regret, or hold the shares either through blind loyalty
or with loyalty diminished by the lack of acknowledgement.
The investor with diminished loyalty may also postpone the
exit decisionwhile searching for alternatives, as cognitive pro-
cesses dominate over affect. In our model, loyalty meditates
the movement from voice to exit, as Bootsma (2013) proposes.
We signify this in the model by the dotted line around loyalty.FROM PROCESSES TO EFFECTS AND A
WIDER RESEARCH AGENDA
The Goranova and Ryan (2014) review identiﬁes “outcomes”
of shareholder activism at ﬁrm, investor, and societal levels.
Their review and our search identify studies each with inter-
esting ﬁndings that allude to effects of ﬁnancially oriented
shareholder activism on corporate policy, corporate perfor-
mance, and investment performance (Becht, Franks, Grant,
& Wagner, 2015; Brav et al., 2008a; Brav, Jiang, Partnoy &Volume 24 Number 3 May 2016
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2013).
Welker and Wood (2011) argue that ﬁnancially motivated
activism of US corporate raiders in the 1970s and 1980s
unleashed radical changes at ﬁrm level and business logics
and structures worldwide. Other studies suggest social
activists can inﬂuence corporate policy on social or environ-
mental affairs (Rehbein et al., 2013). Voice acknowledged
and accepted can lead to changes in ﬁrms, their performance
(ﬁnancial, reputational, social, etc.), practices, governance
arrangements, and reputation. However, these are fragments
of insight, providing a partial, equivocal view of signiﬁcant
“outcomes” of the relationship between shareholding and
corporate governance.We propose ourmodel of active owner-
ship to stimulate further research into processes, outcomes,
and effects of active ownership in ways that relate to funda-
mental questions of why, for whom, and how corporate
governance matters.
Aguilera et al. (2015: 487) suggest four objectives for effec-
tive corporate governance concerning: (1) protection and
enforcement of shareholder rights through managerial
accountability; (2) mediation of different interests and de-
mands of internal and external stakeholders; (3) transparent
disclosure; and (4) provision of strategic and ethical guidance.
Our model of active ownership, especially the process
whereby shareholders engage directly with management in
a process of dialogue for mutual beneﬁt, path (b), seems
pertinent to the ﬁrst, second, and fourth of those objectives.
Concerning the third, close, interpersonal relationships would
seem to involve deeper transparency than those seen in the
formalities of public disclosure. If the processes and behavior
associated with path (a), which include trading shares or the
episodic form of activism, are actually the dominant mode of
action by shareholders, then a host of questions arise. They
concern the meta-theme of corporate governance change
throughout the breadth and depth of relations that make up
the system of corporate governance. By way of indication, a
substantive research agenda and related questions are raised
below covering the interplay of markets and institutions,
plural actors, their relations, resources, and expression of
interests and power.
Market and Institutional Context
Has the ﬁnancial crisis signaled a turning point in equity
capital markets, in policy, practice, or purpose? Does the
investment industry serve or subjugate ﬁnancial and social
goals? Domore liquidmarkets protect investors but also point
them toward self-regarding behavior and a short-term orien-
tation? If concepts of shareholder value and primacy have be-
come institutionalized in the neoliberal market economies of
the UK and US (Lok, 2010; Lounsbury, 2008) and encouraged
short-termism (Barton & Wiseman, 2015), are these major
obstacles to psychological ownership affecting movement
along path (b)?
Active ownership has, since the ﬁnancial crisis, become
embodied in policy initiatives in many countries. That does
not mean that such a stance is common among investors or
easy to achieve. Current institutional arrangements embed
assumptions of shareholder primacy and agency theory even
as they advocate stewardship, with its purposeful dialogueVolume 24 Number 3 May 2016and mutual understanding. Through its model, this paper
has sought to theorize what is involved in stewardship, and
illustrates that in using path (b). By doing so, we show the
challenge facing policy. Path (a) is the dominant behavior in
the market, and any change to path (b) is a complex process
that will need to evolve over time. It faces hurdles imposed
by a market context created in part by technologies and
encouraged by policy and other institutional forces striving
for valuable outcomes in domains other than corporate gover-
nance. The suggestion of funds evolving to coverﬁnancial and
responsible investment imperatives and preparing and taking
long-term investment is a sign of some progress in that evolu-
tion, but it remains to be seen how far and fast that process
will go. Market dynamics suggest that ownership will con-
tinue to have many different expressions, so the question is
more about tendencies and what this means for who beneﬁts
andwhat thismeans for the long and short term. An empirical
agenda directed at identifying emergent practices and policies
that encourage investors along the path of active ownership
(path (b)) is important for future research in corporate
governance.Universal Owners and Funds of Funds
The pension funds run by the giant corporations of the 1950s
and 1960s, or by giant trade unions of the same period, are
now largely closed to new members. The market context we
describe suggests considerable pressure for disengaged share
ownership, even among the pension funds whose liabilities
call out for assets with a long-term horizon (Tilba &McNulty,
2013). The patient capital of Warren Buffett is a model few if
any have followed, or could. Much of the new money from
those end-investors ﬂows not into such funds, but into the
funds-of-funds, detaching ownership even further from
control by the end-beneﬁciary, with the consequence of
greater intermediation. It may be a laudable goal to set policy
to persuade institutional investors to serve the whole econ-
omy as a universal owner would. But are such prescriptions
impractical in drawing on an idea associatedwithwhat seems
to be a dying class of investor? Is policy also putting share-
holders on a pedestal at a time when many voices within
the policy framework are questioning unintended effects of
the pursuit of shareholder value and whether the primary
purpose of corporations is to serve investor interest?Asset Firm Management
How do asset management organization and specialization
relate to paths (a) and (b)? Some asset management ﬁrms
organize themselves internallywith investment selection (that
is, the buy-sell-hold decision) conducted by one category of
employees (the fund manager), while the proxy voting deci-
sion is done by another (the governance) department. These
correspond to the exercise of exit and voice, but crudely so.
Both representatives of the investor may meet corporate man-
agers, sometimes separately, while others use processes to
coordinate or collaborate concerning such contact. Corporate
ofﬁcers tell stories frequently of contradictory conversations
with the two contact types. How do these combinations affect
understanding on both sides?© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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In cases of concerted action, how do inter-organizational
processes help or hinder development of active ownership?
What happens when other-regarding, long-term oriented
investors with strong psychological ownership collaborate
with self-regarding, short-term focused legal owners? What
effects does each have on the other?
Shareholder–Company Interaction
More formal interactions (e.g., shareholder resolutions,
voting) are often supplemented with semi-formal ones
(e.g., roadshows) and informal ones (dinners, one-on-one
meetings), with increasing intimacy (Marston, 2008). The
corporate governance literature is suspicious of close ties,
as Roberts, McNulty, and Stiles (2005) observe. But intimacy
may nurture affective responses in the face of calculative, ra-
tional, and procedural investment decision making. Research
could help to identify the feedback loops between methods
of voice and development of psychological ownership.
Board–Shareholder Interaction
How do boards relate to shareholders and how does that
relationship affect the transition from path (a) to path (b)?
The pathways of active ownership primarily accord to
processes and related patterns of behavior. Inherent within
the contrast between the distant or sometimes adversarial
vnature of path (a) and the engaged, collaborative nature of
path (b), are questions about relationships and, in particular,
spirals of relationship building and decline. There are few
studies of this yet, but it is an important area for development.CONCLUSIONS
The ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–09 and the role that corporate
governance played in it make clear that we still have much
to learn (Ahrens, Filatotchev, & Thomsen, 2011). Investors
and corporations sit at the centre of the corporate governance
system and we need to better understand how these two sets
of actors work with and against each other. There is much
more to be done to understand cognitive, affective, and beha-
vioral aspects underlying relations of distance and closeness
implied by pathways which constitute the model of active
ownership in this article. For scholars to prise open the multi-
dimensionality of engagement and relations of trust and dis-
trust between key institutions and actors is crucial if the ﬁeld
is to engage with the concerns of good corporate governance.
Relationships need also relate to formal institutional arrange-
ments, for example, the proxy access reform in the United
States – giving long-term shareholders greater ability to nom-
inate directors – is a counterpoint for Swedish law, in which
nomination committees are external to the board and com-
prise directors and representatives of blockholders (cf. Dent,
2012). The former is confrontational and impersonal; the latter
is collaborative and personal but privileges one class of inves-
tor over others. Such developments open possibilities for new
approaches to illuminate the paths to active ownership.
Practitioners need to understand those relationships empir-
ically and theoretically if they are to make informed choices© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltdabout how they should work together. Policymakers require
such knowledge, too, to anticipate how any adjustments to
the formal institutions of corporate governance may work,
and to realize they will have limitations as well as
possibilities.
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NOTES
1. For a brief discussion of the methods used in the review, see
Appendix A.
2. These are different from, though similar in a way to, active and
passive portfoliomanagement, where the formermeans deliberate
selection of investment and the latter investing according to an a
priori rule, as in index-tracking.
3. Legal scholarship sometimes draws a distinction between “legal”
and “equitable” ownership based on whether the owner is
afforded rights over the assets or rights only over the proceeds
of the assets (Glackin, 2011; Hohfeld, 2014). In common use in
corporate governance the two concepts are often conﬂated. In this
article, “legal ownership” means legal rights over the equity, and
the bundle of rights is limited in company law.
4. A similar mix of cognitive and affective mechanisms appears in
scholarship concerning the “engagement” of consumers with
brands (Brodie, Hollebeek, Jurić, & Ilić, 1917).
5. This is a slight simpliﬁcation: In many countries shares are voted
by the holder on a “record” date some time before the share-
holders’meeting.
6. Since the ﬁnancial crisis, the once-ubiquitous 2-and-20 formula
used by hedge funds (two per cent of assets under management
and 20 percent of capital gains) has come under pressure, mainly
through changes in the percentages rather than the structure. In
banking, regulators have sought to move director-level remunera-
tion to a longer time horizon and include “clawbacks.” Such
moves featured less prominently in asset management.APPENDIX A: Methods
This article was developed on the basis of a number of distinct
but related strands of literature review and analysis using the
Web of Science database involving a focused search for peer-
reviewed articles using institutional investor* or shareholder*
with engage*, activis* or steward* in their topics or titles. The
search was restricted to shareholder actions, rather than acti-
vist groups in general. We looked speciﬁcally for empirical
studies, major reviews, seminal theoretical contributions and
conceptual frameworks across the range of disciplines in
corporate governance studies.
The search for “institutional investor” generated the largest
group of papers (topic = 2,441) and (title = 522). “Shareholder
activism” generated 430 references while “shareholder en-
gagement” generated 128 references. Combining the “topics”
“institutional investor” and “activism” generated 237 refer-
ences. All these were reviewed, along with an additional 16
references generated when “engagement” was included as
a topic in the search. Further articles added when the “ﬁnan-
cial crisis” and shareholder activism were combined in theVolume 24 Number 3 May 2016
356 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEWsearch, bringing the total to 292 papers. After ﬁltering for
duplicates, 188 articles were identiﬁed for more detailed
examination.REFERENCES
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